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Chapter Eleven.  Perceptual Politics 
 
Aesthetics and politics 
 It is clear that the critical power of the aesthetic makes it an effective instrument 
for social analysis, one that has not yet been adequately recognized or utilized.  Its 
significance lies not only in the ability of the aesthetic to serve as a critical tool for 
probing social practice but as a beacon for illuminating the direction of social 
betterment.  This may seem at first to be an outlandish claim but for the fact that the 
aesthetic has begun to emerge as a key factor in political theory, although its 
transformative implications have not been reckoned.  
 
 In recent times this connection between aesthetics and politics has become 
explicit. The literature is large, ranging from observations of an aesthetic politics that 
began with Nietzsche (although preceded by Kant and Hegel), moving through 
Heidegger, Benjamin, Blanchot, Adorno, Marcuse, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and most 
recently to Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, and Rancière, to cite only some of the more 
prominent contributors. 
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 Two significant features mark the discussions of the social relevance of the 
aesthetic in this body of literature.  One is the focus of philosophical commentaries on 
what art and literature signify and contribute to our understanding of truth and being. 
The other is their concern with the social relevance of the aesthetic in experience, 
politics, and the nature of society.  For many of these thinkers the aesthetic is uttered in 
the same breath as art, and art is often seen here through either a Marxist or a 
psychoanalytic lens, or through both.  
 
 We can take Herbert Marcuse as one example.  Marcuse’s views reflect the 
influence of both Marx and Freud.  Art, he holds, has a liberating function:  “it is 
committed to an emancipation of sensibility, imagination, and reason in all spheres of 
subjectivity and objectivity.”  Important as this emancipation is, it has its source, 
Marcuse argues, in “Eros, the deep affirmation of the Life Instincts in their fight against 
instinctual and social oppression.”  Art has an ideological function, as well, but Marcuse 
is critical of Marxist aesthetics for its class-based analysis of art, even though he 
acknowledges that there is always a social presence in art.  Art contributes to the 
political struggle by helping achieve a change of consciousness.1    
 
 Both of these influences, Marxism and psychoanalysis, characterize the writings 
of the Frankfurt School, with which Marcuse was associated, and are central in the work 
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of Theodor Adorno and its other leading figures.  Adorno’s lengthy Aesthetic Theory, a 
representative example, deals almost exclusively with art.  Without contesting Adorno’s 
case for the significance of art in culture, society, and politics, I claim that art is not the 
most fundamental factor in aesthetic analysis.   
 
 We find the same identification of the aesthetic with the arts in theorists 
associated with post-structuralism and deconstruction.  Jean-François Lyotard, for 
example, coupled aesthetics with the arts in his intense concern over their critical 
function. His belief in the “deep-seated exteriority of art” sees art as a political force and 
an alternative to theory, and aesthetics, he believed, shares this critical role. 2  Gilles 
Deleuze made a similar association where “the two senses of the aesthetic become 
one, to the point where the being of the sensible reveals itself in the work of art, while at 
the same time the work of art appears as experimentation.” 3     
 
 It is of basic import, however, to recognize the difference between art and the 
aesthetic and to separate the consideration of each from that of the other.  From all that 
has gone before in this book, it is clear that, even though intimately related, these terms 
have very different meanings and referents.  I have maintained that the aesthetic is a 
mode of experience that rests on the directness and immediacy of sensuous perception,  
perception that is deeply influenced by the multitude of factors affecting all experience – 
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cognitive, cultural, historical, personal.  Art, on the other hand, denotes the multifarious 
ways in which people shape that experience. Traditionally this process of shaping direct 
experience has been done through artifacts, especially in painting and sculpture, poetry 
and fiction, and most of the other art forms.   This fashioning of experience has gone on 
regardless of whether the arts are traditional or classical, contemporary or popular.   Art 
has also been made by directly manipulating the perceptual materials of immediate 
experience, as in performance art and conceptual art, as well as in dance.  Since 
perception as an experiential condition precedes the activities through which it is 
shaped, channeled, and ordered, it denotes the fundamental ground of all artistic 
activity.  Aesthetic perception is thus the foundation of art, and aesthetic theory should 
deal with both art and perception. 
 
 Certainly the breadth of aesthetic perception invites pursuit in many directions. 
But here I focus on one that is especially important for its critical potential:  the social.   
My intent in this book is to explore the foundational significance and social uses of 
aesthetic perception. And as neither perception nor cognition is self-contained, 
consideration of the one will illuminate the other.  The appearance of the aesthetic as a 
prominent theme in political theory is one of its striking uses.  
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 Moved by the pervasiveness and insistence of political forces in social life, many 
scholars have been drawn increasingly to recognize the strands of the aesthetic that are 
woven into its texture. They have gone beyond dealing with the ways that the arts are 
used in political propaganda and for arousing patriotic feeling.  The aesthetic has come 
to be recognized as a perceptual domain of considerable power and influence, and 
some analysts have assigned it a crucial place in political theory.  Making the aesthetic 
central in political theory may be surprising, for two such dissimilar domains of thought 
and experience might seem, at first, difficult to reconcile.  Yet the association of 
aesthetics with politics has been made, and it will be illuminating to look at some 
applications that assign the aesthetic dimension a critical place in social and political 
thought.  Let me then trace some of the appeals to the aesthetic in founding political 
theory, first considering Friedrich Schiller before moving into contemporary proposals. 
 
Schiller’s Letters  and beauty as a condition of humanity 
 This recent scholarly trend has its most direct source in Schiller’s Letters on the 
Aesthetic Education of Man  (1795).4  This early work by the German romantic poet 
continues to radiate a benign influence despite profound changes in the intellectual 
climate.  Schiller’s detailed and eloquent study openly reflects the early influence of 
Kantian philosophy.  At the same time, his own thinking developed over the several 
years during which the Letters were composed.  We find in them, then, not so much a 
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consistent philosophical exposition as an expanding understanding of the conditions of 
human fulfillment in what he called the aesthetic state.  
 
 Schiller went to eloquent lengths in recognizing and attempting to accommodate 
the different and sometimes conflicting aspects of human experience, principally the 
physical, sensory factors and the rational, cognitive ones.  Following Kant, he found 
their reconciliation in a balance that allows absolute dominance to neither but rather 
integrates their forces in harmonious interplay.  The ‘disposition,’ as he called it, that 
emerges in this process and makes this resolution possible is the aesthetic.  Humanity 
is most fulfilled, Schiller claimed, in the contemplation of beauty, and a genuine work of 
art, requiring both our sensuous and intellectual powers, creates in us the loftiness and 
strength of spirit that characterize freedom.   
 
 This brings us to the heart of our present concern for, Schiller argued, through 
beauty people acquire a social character, and taste makes social harmony possible by 
establishing harmony in the individual.5  Thus a homology emerges between the fulfilled 
person and the aesthetic state that is reminiscent of Plato’s theory of justice in The 
Republic.  “Everything in the aesthetic State, even the subservient tool, is a free citizen 
having equal rights with the noblest….”  In such a condition of aesthetic appearance the 
ideal of equality is fulfilled.6 
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 For Schiller, then, the beautiful world exemplifies its moral standing and 
represents the freedom of the citizen in which every person is restored to a harmony of 
rational and sensory forces.  “Beauty alone can confer on him [Man] a social 
character.”7 At the same time this is no private, individual affair but is social through and 
through, for an aesthetic sensibility promotes empathy and an awareness of others. 
Schiller thus brought together the aesthetic, the moral, and the social.8  No one has 
united these strands of human value more explicitly or more eloquently. 
 
 Finding a model of community in the aesthetic has become a recurrent theme in 
recent political philosophy.  This shows not only the suggestiveness of the aesthetic but 
also displays the widely different interpretations it has received.  Let me consider 
several representative examples here, not with the intent of developing a full-blown 
critique of each but rather of revealing some of the uses to which the aesthetic has been 
put in political theory. 
 
Ankersmit on aesthetic politics 
 In his book Aesthetic Politics,  F. R. Ankersmit uses the aesthetic in an original 
and provocative defense of democracy.9  The core of his argument is based on an 
analogy between pictorial representation and that which is represented, on the one 
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hand, and between the state and the citizen, on the other.  It is mistaken, Ankersmit 
insists, to assume that there is some kind of unity between the work of art and the 
world.  The separation between representation and represented is unbridgeable; 
moreover, this same “aesthetic barrier” exists between citizen and state.  Ankersmit 
argues that this breach must be recognized as the foundation of the democratic model, 
for it is out of their conflict that political power and the proper forms of its disposition 
arise.   
 
 A democratic state, therefore, cannot develop by means of direct democracy or 
out of a common bond between citizen and state.  Such attempts lead to bureaucratic 
social and political intermediaries that provide the basis for totalitarianism.10  Thus 
political differences about whether a state properly represents its people is like 
disagreeing over whether a painting represents reality properly.  Such disputes can 
never be objectively resolved  but reflect differences in taste or feeling that are similarly 
unresolvable.  And, Ankersmit holds further, just as there are no fixed rules that tell 
painters how to go from the landscape to their picture of it, aesthetic political theory 
makes us aware of an aesthetic gap or void between the represented and the 
representative, between the state and society. Thus like the artist’s picture, political 
theory ought to retain a prominent role for the state and we should focus on its 
enhanced position to better understand present-day democratic politics.   
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 Ankersmit carries the aesthetic analogy further.  Each artist and each distinctive 
style determines anew how to make the transition from the represented to its 
representation.  This constant process of renewal is also why all works of art belong to a 
new or different world that cannot be reduced to the world that we experience.11   Such 
an approach confirms the view that legitimate political power originates in this aesthetic 
difference between the individual citizen and his or her representative.  Therefore, 
Ankersmit concludes, political power possesses an 'aesthetic' rather than an 'ethical' 
nature, and an ethical approach to politics should be replaced by an aesthetic one.12    
 
 Ankersmit’s political argument is guided entirely by this underlying aesthetic 
analogy, and the scope and detail with which he develops it are impressive.  It is all the 
more surprising that a case so inclusive and replete with historical and analytical detail 
should devote so little attention to establishing and justifying this reading of the 
aesthetic.  For the claims on which his argument rests are not commonly 
acknowledged.  Ankersmit’s use of the aesthetic actually begs the question of the 
separation between the landscape and the painting of the landscape.  While these may 
be different, their relationship can be explained in various ways, not all of them by an 
unbridgeable gap.  Some accounts emphasize their resemblance and stress the 
continuities between landscape and painting and between the experience of landscape 
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and the experience of painting. Other accounts see painting as self-sufficient and find 
no need to reconcile or compare it with what might seem to be represented.  What 
Ankersmit simply takes for granted as the unbridgeability of the representation and the 
represented treats one of the most obstinate and unresolved puzzles in aesthetics --  
the ontology of the work of art – as settled.  Moreover, this issue is not generally 
considered to be the central concern of aesthetic theory.   
 
 The pertinence of Ankersmit’s analysis, then, is highly questionable.  For some 
theorists the illumination that art offers is accessible only when centered on the work of 
art alone and does not depend on a close relation with an external subject-matter.  The 
subject of a portrait, for example, is not the person who sat for it but the person in the 
painting, itself.  Museums are filled with portraits whose models, if known at all, are long 
gone.  Such information, moreover, is generally considered as of historical interest only 
and aesthetically irrelevant.  The painting is complete and self-sufficient and simply 
offers itself as such.  Indeed, in the hands of a master, the brush can tell us more about 
the person than we may be able to articulate from knowledge of the actual individual.  
Furthermore, for many aestheticians the comparison is irrelevant.  Much the same can 
be said of the landscape.  The Platonic comparison of an image with its reality is beside 
the point:  the only reality is the image.   
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 This dualism of a painting and its subject, like so many other divisions of the 
world, creates other problems.  For when we compare a painting with its subject, we are 
engaging cognitive concerns that obscure the painting that is before our eyes with the 
question, How close is the likeness or resemblance?  Furthermore, this problem does 
not exist for abstract art, where there may be hardly a recognizable bond between the 
pictorial surface and the surface of the world.  That is to say, art is about itself, and only 
in the illumination we gain by engaging with the work can we gain a resonant 
understanding that we can carry away.  Much more can be said in response to this 
supposed problem, but it is sufficient here to recognize both the assumptiveness of 
Ankersmit’s argument and its questionability.  
 
 But this is not the only difficulty with Ankersmit’s case:  its logic is seriously 
flawed.  For even if his aesthetic claim were solid, it would provide only a flimsy base for 
his political analysis.  Arguments from analogy have a weak logical status for they are 
suggestive rather than demonstrative.  An analogy does not prove the parallel that is 
drawn; it only proposes a resemblance in the expectation that this will suggest how the 
parallel could be more complete.  A purported resemblance between a painting and its 
subject-matter, on the one side, and an individual and the state, on the other, thus fails 
on logical as well as aesthetic grounds.  For whether or not there is a disjunction 
inherent in the aesthetic relation proves nothing about the political one.  More 
285 
 
compelling reasons than an aesthetic parallel that is itself questionable must be given if 
Ankersmit wishes to reject any intermediary or continuity in the human-political relation.  
However, he simply assumes the separation and proceeds to utilize it as an explanatory 
principle.   
 
 What is perhaps most interesting here is that an appeal is made to aesthetics to 
justify a political theory.  And just as the aesthetic involved is a particular feature or 
issue and not a theory, so, too, are the social meanings to which it is unquestioningly 
applied.  For Ankersmit’s view of the political problem lies in a disjunctive relation of the 
individual and the state, a relation and the conflict it engenders that stand, he asserts, 
as the basis for political democracy.  This, however, is no statement of political or social 
fact but a problem that arises from the very way it is structured, a conceptual dilemma 
far more common than is usually recognized.  The discussions earlier in this book have 
made the case that no entities are wholly discrete, yet it is an unquestioned axiom of 
liberal democracy that the difference between the individual and the state is 
fundamental and ineradicable:  it is a distinction made into an opposition. Many of the 
various political theories and mechanisms that have been proposed are efforts not so 
much to reconcile as to balance these presumably opposed interests.  This is what can 
be termed, following the phenomenologist Marvin Farber, a methodogenic problem, one 
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that arises out of the adoption of a method, in this case, a methodology of division, and 
not from the substance of the situation.13 
 
 This political analysis, then, receives little support from what turns out to be a 
basic disanalogy with art.  For whatever may be the case in aesthetics, art has little in 
common with political theory other than, in Ankersmit’s analysis, a separation into pairs 
of irreconcilable parts.  Can aesthetics contribute to politics anything more than an 
imaginative logical suggestion?  That Ankersmit has recourse to the aesthetic suggests 
that a special value may reside there.  His use, unfortunately, does little to identify or 
profit from it, but the value of aesthetics, heuristic or substantive, is something that 
others have nonetheless considered.  Like the arts, aesthetics has been put to multiple 
purposes and it is instructive to continue to follow its uses in political theory, as distinct 
from its traditional role in a critical analysis of art.   
 
Ferguson on aesthetics and community 
 Kennan Ferguson offers another such appropriation of the aesthetic by appealing 
to Kant’s theory of judgment to provide the basis for community.14   Kant’s recourse to a 
sensus communis, the capacity for judging in a fashion that is common to human 
reason as a whole as the grounds for affirming a subjective universal, leads aesthetics, 
like morality, to the public sphere.  Like others, Ferguson credits Kant with creating an 
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ethical aesthetics, ”a normative public sphere that directs, teaches, and demands 
communal standards.”15  It is by means of disinterestedness, he holds, that aesthetic 
judgment, like moral judgment, can overcome its subjective grounds and affirm its public 
setting.   
 
 As he develops his case, Ferguson is rightly concerned to retain the integrity of 
those differences in identity that are invariably present among people and spawn social 
diversity, determinants that are variously ethnic, cultural, and gender-based.  He thinks 
that, by recourse to the non-linguistic figuration of aesthetics, we can hope to grasp the 
complexities and ambiguities of political identity and communal  understanding.  “The 
potency of aesthetics is in its very flexibility and contingency.”16 
 
 We find here the important recognition that the aesthetic, like the moral, involves 
an individual determination, yet one that is at the very same time a communal one.  For 
judgments of taste carry a determination that is public as well as private and hence 
possess social significance.  Ferguson’s emendation of the Kantian universal so that it 
can accommodate fundamental social and cultural diversity is important and necessary.   
Yet significant as this is, to ground it on Kant’s appeal to a sensus communis elevates a 
hypothetical construction to axiomatic status on a doubly weak underpinning.  Kant’s 
common sense is not an empirical truth; it is a metaphysical principle given logical 
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status that is dictated by the necessity for universality by basing judgment on concepts 
and not feeling.17  
 
 A significant consideration in political theory Is thus grounded on aesthetics but 
at the cost of accepting the Kantian fiction of a sensus communis.  Such an appeal to 
aesthetics in political theory gets its credibility from Kant but its aesthetic import is 
wholly casual.  Is there something less assumptive than postulating a sensus communis 
that can bring aesthetic judgment to a common focus?18  
 
Chytry on the aesthetic state 
 The most extensive and intensive examination of the significance of aesthetics in 
cultural and social thought is undoubtedly Josef Chytry’s 1968 study, The Aesthetic 
State.19  Focusing on the aesthetic impact on German thought from the mid-eighteenth 
century to the mid-twentieth, Chytry finds its origins in Greek culture, particularly in the 
Homeric model of aesthetic judgment exemplified in the Judgment of Paris and the 
Athenian polis.  He regards the Greek amalgam of poetry and politics in rhetoric and 
persuasion as the theatricalizing of political life.  Chytry sees this aestheticism as the 
guiding ideal of a tradition that runs through Florentine poetic humanism, with its courtly 
aestheticism and its model of the artist-magician-scientist, to the mid-eighteenth century 
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in England and the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who formalized aesthetics for modern 
thought.20 
 
 The main body of this extensive survey pursues the political ideal of the polis 
through a series of major German thinkers, from Winckelmann and Schiller to 
Heidegger and Marcuse.  Chytry’s careful scholarship is unnecessarily recondite, and it 
is further hampered by a style that layers classical, mythological, and historical allusions 
in language whose obscurity of expression magnifies its complexity.  Nonetheless his 
study is a major effort to articulate the significance of the aesthetic in human moral and 
social life.  For Chytry the aesthetic state is no simple condition but an expressive life 
that joins persuasion, loveliness, and fairness.21  This amalgam of the moral, the social, 
and the aesthetic, rooted in classical thought, is a powerful ideal.  It is a vision that 
achieves universality, he believes, in the tradition of the Kantian subjective universal of 
the Third Critique.  
 
 Chytry’s notion of the aesthetic thus fuses Homeric poetry, the “tragedy” of Troy, 
and the theatricality of politicians’ persuasive rhetoric in the Greek aesthetic state with 
the courtly splendor of the late Renaissance and early Baroque.  And with these he 
joins Shaftesbury’s endorsement of that Greek ideal, along with his elevation of the 
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enjoyment of beauty as the highest good.22  All this Chytry transmutes into the ideal of 
an aesthetic state as the manifestation of beauty.23   
 
 In this way Chytry boldly amasses the cultural forces of the lengthy Western 
tradition in the fulfillment of a vision that is both beautiful and noble.  At the same time 
he is bound by the dimensions of that tradition.  While synthesizing the greatest and 
best of its humanistic understanding, his boundaries retain the Kantian frame of the 
subjectivity of freedom in a universe of rational objectivity, and his model remains the 
Athenian polis with its theatrical rhetoric of persuasion.  Politically, too, he is tied to the 
Western tradition that preserves its faith in liberal individualism, a tradition epitomizing 
so much of the Western understanding of freedom.  Chytry’s aesthetic state thus 
possesses the warmth of the humanizing ideal without its creative illumination. 
 
Rancière and the politics of sensibility 
 In recent political theory the most forthright use of the aesthetic in its 
etymological meaning as sense perception has undoubtedly been made by Jacques 
Rancière, principally in The Politics of Aesthetics (Le partage du sensible: Esthétique et 
politique).24  His identification of the aesthetic with perceptual experience is both 
distinctive and highly important.  Raincière is one of the few since Schiller to recognize 
the political significance of the perceptual basis of the aesthetic.  He sees the 
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revolutionary significance of Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man in 
placing thought and sensibility on an equal plane.  For Schiller, Rancière holds, 
aesthetic education must develop the capacity to live in a sensible world of free play 
and appearance, and this capacity is the pre-condition of a free political community.25   
 
   Rancière makes the political implications of the aesthetic explicit from the 
outset:  “I call the distribution of the sensible the system of self-evident facts of sense 
perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the 
delimitations that define the respective parts and positions within it.”26  Explicating what 
is meant by le commun, Gabriel Rockhill, the translator, suggests “something in 
common”  or “what is common to the community,” which is “strictly speaking what 
makes or produces a community and not simply an attribute shared by all of its 
members.”27   
 
 Rancière is at pains to distinguish this aesthetics from art and its domination of 
political thought.  He reverts to the Kantian sense of the aesthetic, following Foucault’s 
interpretation, as “the system of a priori  forms determining what presents itself to sense 
experience.  It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the invisible, of 
speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and the stakes of politics 
as a form of experience….It is on the basis of this primary aesthetics that it is possible 
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to raise the question of ‘aesthetic practices’ as I understand them, that is forms of 
visibility that disclose artistic practices, the place they occupy, what they ‘do’ or ‘make’ 
from the standpoint of what is common to the community.”28   
 
 This last has special significance, for “The important thing is that the question of 
the relationship between aesthetics and politics be raised at this level, the level of the 
sensible delimitation of what is common to the community, the forms of its visibility and 
of its organization.”29  The common sensible is the context the arts serve, and they do 
so within what Rancière calls certain ‘regimes’:  the regime of images, the poetic 
regime, and the aesthetic regime.  This last refers to art that is based, not on ways of 
doing and making, but on a mode of thought, a regime of the sensible through which the 
artist renders sensible what has not been codified as knowledge.  It is in this sense that 
art acquires its autonomy, operating independently of ordinary meanings and 
associations and fuelled by a form of thought that has not yet become knowledge.30  
Here is where Schiller’s idea of aesthetic education has its place, leading people to 
recognize the sensible world in order to live in a free political community.   “It is this 
paradigm of aesthetic autonomy that became the new paradigm for revolution….”31   At 
the same time, art becomes the paradigm for work, re-shaping “the landscape of the 
visible” and re-structuring “the relationship between doing, making, being, seeing, and 
saying.”32   
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 The political implications of this redistribution of the sensible are momentous.  
They are a consequence of the ability of artists to recast the perceptual forms that have 
been received and accepted as commonplace.  “The dream of a suitable political work 
of art is in fact the dream of disrupting the relationship between the visible, the sayable, 
and the thinkable” directly through perceptual means.  “It is the dream of an art that 
would transmit meanings in the form of a rupture with the very logic of meaningful 
situations.”33  As Slavoj Žižek explains, Rancière  asserts that “the aesthetic dimension 
[is] INHERENT in any radical emancipatory politics.”34  
 
The perceptual  commons and an aesthetic politics 
 The interest in aesthetics by political theorists is a signal development in 
philosophy.  It is hardly an innovation,35 but its emphatic recurrence in contemporary 
thought has far-reaching significance.  It can mean several things.  One is a desperate 
turn to the arts as a way of rejuvenating political theory, whose re-working of old ground 
has yielded meager results in tired reaffirmations of liberal democratic theory for an age 
so different from its Classical origins and eighteenth century revival.  We might view the 
recourse to aesthetics as a way of bolstering that same ideology, for the recent theorists 
I have discussed, with the exception of Rancière, espouse what is essentially the same 
agenda.  This apologetic use of philosophy has a long history,36 a history shaken at its 
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foundations by Marx and Nietzsche but not displaced.  Let us consider where we now 
stand with the aesthetic. 
 
 The association of aesthetics with the social and the political is, as we have 
seen, neither far-fetched nor casual.  We found in our review of aesthetic politics that 
Rancière’s treatment of the sensible is distinctive in recognizing the political potential in 
the literal meaning of the aesthetic.  He is not alone in following this usage:  Wolfgang 
Welsch has made effective use of the force of aisthēsis as an instrument of cultural 
criticism.37   
 
 The implications for social and political philosophy of this transformation of the 
aesthetic are profound, for when the sensible is followed through on its own terms, the 
results are indeed metamorphic.  I want to claim, further, that it fulfills part of what is 
implicit in the very meaning of perception.  But to my knowledge there has not been any 
attempt to carry through the transformative potential of aisthēsis:  transformative 
politically, transformative culturally, transformative metaphysically.  The groundwork for 
accomplishing this has occupied the previous chapters of this book.  What remains is to 
pursue its social implications and political consequences. 
 
 The history of philosophical explanation notwithstanding, there is no ontology 
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 a priori.  Ontology is itself a social as well as a philosophical construct.  Can we begin, 
then, with the life-world, “that province of reality which the wide-awake and normal adult 
simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense”?38   The life-world can indeed 
be a sobering point of reference, for it situates us in the world we actually inhabit.  At the 
same time, that world is the repository of all the effects of those processes by which 
humans come to consciousness.  And so, together with philosophy, one of its products, 
it is heavily layered. 
 
 The idea of a “perceptual commons” offers a direction in groping through the 
many conceptual layers that form experience in the shape of a human world.  Indeed, 
we may call the perceptual commons the most inclusive environmental condition of 
human life.  By the simple fact of living we are embedded in a perceptual sphere, and it 
is from here that we must proceed in order to function in that world.  This is the point 
from which we must endeavor to understand the conditions that precede all those acts 
of conceptual separation that divide the human world.   
 
 The perceptual commons is not private nor is it public.  It is common.  It is 
present with direct access, and any effort to constrain contact is a deviation from that 
condition – indeed, an imposition.  This carries a heavy baggage of consequences.  
Environmental ones are obvious.  Everyone has a claim to the free and ready 
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enjoyment of pure air, and uses of air that load it with pollutants or smells, that affect its 
temperature, poison its character or quality, set it in violent motion or prevent its 
movement must compensate for those aberrances by restoring its neutrality.  The same 
can be said about visual perception.  Everyone has a stake in the visual environment, 
and this places a heavy social interest on architectural and urban design.  It is appalling 
to recognize how freely and widely industries, groups, and individual people simply 
appropriate large portions of the perceptual commons for their private interests, entirely 
ignoring the social effects of their actions. 
 
 This raises the question of the relation of the social and the individual, one of the 
great themes in Western political theory.  Indeed, from the vantage point of the 
perceptual commons, stating the issue as an opposition of the individual and the social 
rests on a presumptive and vastly misleading social ontology.  The perceptual commons 
is neither social nor individual.  One could liken it to a reservoir, except that it is not a 
reserve but the very substance of experience.   And it is a key point at which the 
widespread oppositional contrast between individual and society displays its error.  That 
idea is itself a social construct so deeply embedded in cultural consciousness in the 
West and for so long that it is difficult to recognize its social origins.  As we have seen, a 
similar fate befalls the concept of subjectivity.  Yet habit does not make ideas true, and 
hoary falsehoods are all the more pernicious for being sanctified.   
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 It is revealing to consider how we might understand the human world from an 
ontology of continuity instead of division, separation, and opposition.  Indeed, the 
perceptual commons is inherently undifferentiated and, from the standpoint of 
perceptual experience, continuity is its most salient characteristic.  Things are not 
perceptually discrete even though some might appear distinct, but differences are 
nonetheless distinguishable.  Aristotle’s recognition of the difference between a 
distinction and a separation provides an underlying insight.  Every object in the human 
world, however it be distinguished in different contexts, has its history and associations 
in relation to human uses.  Often this history is perceptually apparent if we are attentive 
to its signs:  from worn stone steps to social practices of congregation and worship, 
from land and stone conformations on the earth’s surface to geological processes, from 
human physiognomy to diet and health.   
 
 It would be fascinating to sketch the outlines of a human civilization based on the 
recognition of the continuities that draw things together.  That would signify true 
civilization, that is, people living civilly, living in civil society, where the prevailing 
patterns of relations exemplify mutuality, support, and assistance, all the forms of 
enabling that promote human life and fulfillment.  These are markedly in contrast with 
social relations based on opposition:  competition, personal aggrandizement, conflict, 
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power relations, subordination, subjugation, oppression, force, war – all of the many 
modes of conflictual interaction common to the world we humans have fashioned. 
 
 The political implications of an aesthetics based on recognizing humans’ claim to 
the perceptual commons and to its equal enjoyment are world-shattering, for the 
perceptual commons can be construed as the basis for natural justice:   it is an organic 
claim asserted and applied equally.  The social values that would be embodied are 
humane and positive.  Their fulfillment would serve the goals of the many existing social 
institutions and forces that have been striving, under oppressive circumstances, to 
create the conditions in which humans can achieve most fully their individual and 
collective potential.   
 
 Political forms need to be devised to reflect this transformation of social ontology, 
and social forms and institutions need to be developed to further those positive ends.  
These cannot be projected a priori but have to be fashioned as more humane conditions 
develop.  Certainly they would be most unlike the hierarchical and oppositional political 
and social forms that prevail in the present world and that structurally preserve the 
framework of conflict:  public vs. private, individual vs. state, right vs. left.  Consider how 
the forms through which communication takes place and decisions are made embody 
opposition:  debate, dialectic, criticism, argument.  In contrast, open, fair, and equal 
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discussion rarely occurs without being quickly pre-empted by conflictual patterns.  In 
fact, the very concepts of morality itself embody oppositional structure:  good vs. evil, 
guilt and innocence, and in economics, scarcity vs. abundance.   
 
 As part of the moral rehabilitation of social life it is also necessary to expose the 
many myths that obstruct humane goals:  self-justifying beliefs that block changes with 
barriers of negativity and drape humanity in a dark pall.  Among the most pervasive and 
insidious are myths of human nature that ascribe inadequacies and failures to inherent 
defects in human being, such as original sin and ineradicable self-interest and 
selfishness.  Other such myths include supernaturalistic superstitions that place human 
fate in the hands of inscrutable forces.  These are part of a culture of negativity that 
delights in defaming all generous human motives by generalizing those that are self-
gratifying.  But there are others:  there is sympathy as well as selfishness, generosity as 
well as greed, help and support as well as domination and exploitation.  None of these 
traits and patterns is fixed, and a positive, humane world would encourage enabling  
traits and behaviors instead of preaching and ingraining the negative and oppositional.  
It will be difficult to displace this debilitating yet powerful tradition, yet intellectual 
maturity consists in seeing through the myths with which we all are clothed to the naked 
reality beneath.  It is a process of divestment that we can only hope it is not too late to 
begin. 
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